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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
     Appellant Elliott Reihner Siedzikowski & Egan, P.C. ("ERSE") appeals 
the 
District Court's orders granting the motions to dismiss and to stay 
discovery of 
defendants the Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund ("PEBTF") and 
Thomas G. 
Paese and the motion to intervene and for a protective order of 
Independence Blue Cross, 
Capital Blue Cross, and Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania 
(collectively "Blue 
Cross").  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291 and will 
affirm. 
     Because we write only for the parties who well understand the 
procedural history 
and facts of the case, we will not repeat them except as necessary to 
provide context.  
Instead, we will move directly to ERSE's primary contention that the 
statute of 
limitations does not bar the three causes of action contained in its 
complaint   (1) First 




                               I. 
     The first count of the complaint seeks relief under 42 U.S.C.  1983 
for a violation 
of ERSE's First Amendment right to free speech.  ERSE asserts that this 
claim is not 
time-barred.  It is mistaken.  Section 1983 claims are governed by the 
relevant state's 
statute of limitations for personal injury actions.  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 
U.S. 261, 276 
(1985); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 
1996).  In 
Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is 
two years and begins 
running when the cause of action accrues.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
5524(2) (West 
1981 & Supp. 2001); S.T. Hudson Engineers, Inc. v. Camden Hotel Dev. 
Assocs., 747 
A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  The question as to when a section 
1983 action 
accrues is, however, one of federal law.  Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
937 F.2d 899, 
919 (3d Cir. 1991).  Under federal law, the statute of limitations begins 
to run "when the 
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is 
based."  
Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 
(3d Cir. 
1998).      
     Here, ERSE's section 1983 action accrued over five years before the 
complaint 
was filed in the District Court and, thus, is barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations.  
Defendants allegedly violated ERSE's First Amendment right to free speech 
when they 
"retaliated" against ERSE for a letter it sent to PEBTF on April 21, 1995, 
which warned 
that political interests were compromising the Blue Cross matter.  A month 
after the 
letter was sent, PEBTF terminated ERSE.  It was at this moment, May 24, 
1995, that any 
First Amendment right to free speech was violated and that ERSE suffered 
injury.     
     ERSE counters that the unconstitutional retaliation occurred when 
PEBTF 
withheld an earned contingent fee and that this fact was not discoverable 
before 
September 1998 because defendants actively concealed information about the 
settlement 
with Blue Cross.  This argument does not rescue ERSE from the statute of 
limitations.  
ERSE possessed in 1995 facts essential to a First Amendment retaliation 
claim.  See 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (statute of limitations 
runs once a 
plaintiff possesses "the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has 
inflicted the 
injury").  ERSE knew it had exercised its First Amendment right to free 
speech by 
sending the letter.  ERSE also knew that PEBTF had terminated it because 
of the letter.  
On May 24, 1995, therefore, ERSE possessed the information necessary to 
file an action 
under 42 U.S.C.  1983 for violation of its First Amendment right to free 
speech, and a 
jury could have calculated appropriate damages.  Accordingly, ERSE's 
section 1983 
action accrued more than two years before the complaint was filed and is 
barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
 
                              II. 
     Similarly, ERSE's second claim, against PEBTF only, for breach of 
contract is 
barred by the statute of limitations.  ERSE contends that PEBTF breached 
the fee 
agreement when it refused to pay an earned contingent fee.  Although ERSE 
attempts to 
characterize its claim as one for breach of contract, it is in fact a 
claim for quantum 
meruit.  In Pennsylvania, it is well-established that a client has an 
absolute right to 
terminate an attorney at any time for any reason, regardless of any 
contract.  Kenis v. 
Perini Corp., 682 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Hiscott & Robinson 
v. King, 626 
A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  The dismissed attorney's remedy is 
a quantum 
meruit action to recover the value of services rendered.  Novinger v. E.I. 
DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987); Kenis, 682 A.2d at 
849; Hiscott 
& Robinson, 626 A.2d at 1237; Sundheim v. Beaver County Bldg. & Loan 
Assoc., 14 
A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940).  The statute of limitations for a 
quantum meruit 
action is four years.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  5525(4) (West 1981 & 
Supp. 2001); 
Kenis, 682 A.2d at 849; Fowkes v. Shoemaker, 661 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995).  
A quantum meruit action accrues on the date of the attorney's termination.  
Kenis, 682 
A.2d at 849; Fowkes, 661 A.2d at 880.  Under these well-recognized 
principles, ERSE's 
action against PEBTF for legal fees arose on May 24, 1995, the date of its 
termination, 
and is time-barred. 
     ERSE attempts to avoid this result by arguing that PEBTF and Blue 
Cross 
intentionally conspired to cheat it out of its contingent fee and that 
under these conditions 
a discharged attorney may recover the full fee on a breach of contract 
theory.  We 
recognize that under Pennsylvania law a breach of contract action for 
contingent fees may 
lie when "a collusive and fraudulent settlement is made for the purposes 
of defrauding an 
attorney out of his fees."  Paul v. Horton, No. CIV.A. 95-5791, 1996 WL 
297572, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. May 22, 1996); see also Bennett v. Sinclair Nav. Co., 33 F. 
Supp. 14, 17 (E.D. 
Pa. 1940).  However, we do not read the complaint as alleging that PEBTF 
and Blue 
Cross conspired to defraud ERSE out of its fees.  Although the complaint 
clearly alleges 
that PEBTF terminated ERSE for political reasons, it does not allege a 
factual scenario in 
which, as in Bennett, PEBTF was on the verge of settling with Blue Cross 
through ERSE, 
but settled on its own in order to avoid paying ERSE its contingent fee.  
See also Paul, 
1996 WL 297572, at *8 (denying contingent fees to terminated lawyer where 
settlement 
was not near conclusion at time of termination).   
     Moreover, ERSE alleges no facts indicating that it had taken 
substantial steps 
towards settling the Blue Cross matter before it was terminated.  See id. 
at *8 (denying 
contingent fees to terminated lawyer where the attorney's services had not 
contributed to 
the settlement).  Indeed, ERSE did not even allege that it ever contacted 
counsel for Blue 
Cross, much less held negotiations with them.  ERSE's work consisted 
solely of 
preparing a draft of a complaint.  In light of these factors, ERSE's claim 
cannot be 
considered a claim for breach of contract, but rather as one for quantum 
meruit, and is 
therefore barred by the statute of limitations. 
 
                              III. 
     ERSE's last claim, against Paese only, for intentional interference 
with contractual 
relations is also barred by the statute of limitations.  The statute of 
limitations in 
Pennsylvania for the tort of interference with contractual relations is 
two years.  42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann.  5524(3) (West 1981 & Supp. 2001); Bednar v. Marino, 646 
A.2d 
573, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Torchia v. Keystone Foods Corp., 635 A.2d 
1082, 1086 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  The cause of action accrues "as soon as the right 
to institute and 
maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do 
not toll the 
running of the statute of limitations."  Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. 
Pocono Produce, 
Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983).  In other words, the statute of 
limitations commences 
upon the defendant's first act interfering with the contract.  Dellape v. 
Murray, 651 A.2d 
638, 640 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Eagan v. U.S. Expansion Bolt Co., 469 A.2d 
680, 681 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 
     On the facts alleged in the complaint, ERSE should have first become 
aware of 
Paese's interference with the PEBTF contract when it received a draft of 
Paese's tolling 
agreement on January 25, 1995.  This agreement was negotiated by Paese 
without 
ERSE's knowledge or assistance.  If this act was not enough to notify ERSE 
of Paese's 
interference, certainly Paese's transmittal of a final copy of the tolling 
agreement was 
more than enough; indeed, ERSE itself contends that the tolling agreement 
severely 
undermined PEBTF's ability to obtain maximum recovery from Blue Cross.  
Paese's 
interference was even more evident at the March 10, 1995 meeting where he 
allegedly 
explicitly acknowledged that he would not allow PEBTF to maximize recovery 
due to 
outside political interests.  And, at the very latest, ERSE should have 
realized on May 24, 
1995 that Paese was frustrating its contract with PEBTF when it received a 
letter stating 
that the "litigation committee" was terminating ERSE's representation.  At 
that point, 
ERSE suffered concrete and substantial harm, i.e., it lost the contract 
and any contingent 
fees therefrom.  Clearly, a cause of action for intentional interference 
with contractual 
relations, if one indeed existed, accrued no later than May 24, 1995, and 
is time-barred. 
 
                              IV. 
     In sum, ERSE's claims are barred by the relevant statutes of 
limitations.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order dismissing the 
complaint. 
 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
     Kindly file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 
 
                                   /s/ Maryanne Trump Barry       
                                                          Circuit Judge 
 
